Mahmoud Sufiani; Mohammad Asghari; Mohsen Bagherzadeh Meshkibaf
Abstract
The French Revolution is recognized as the first concrete presence of the modern individual in history, where he stands for the realization of right and liberty against the absolute power of the king and wants absolute freedom. But Hegel, despite much praise for the revolution, deals with Pathology and ...
Read More
The French Revolution is recognized as the first concrete presence of the modern individual in history, where he stands for the realization of right and liberty against the absolute power of the king and wants absolute freedom. But Hegel, despite much praise for the revolution, deals with Pathology and critiques the meaning of will, freedom, and individuality in them. At the end of the Spirit chapter of Phenomenology, Hegel deals with the French Revolution, especially the era of terror and, in his dialectical space, rises to the battle by imagining the revolution from the absolute self-consciousness, absolute freedom, partial will, and general will, and proves Robespierre’ and the French nation’s abstract and hollow understanding of these terms. Hegel, after this criticism, also implicitly deals with Rousseau's critique as the foregrounding of the French conception of the meaning of these terms. After examining the outcome of absolute freedom and all its determinations to the end, Hegel redefines the fundamental terms in the Terror section and illustrates how public freedom and will are realized in his political thought system whereby penetrating into the absolute power and will, not only does the particular return to the individual again, but also realizes the whole inside him through outer mediators, and in this way, coming up with a very precise definition of the whole exclusive in individual and returning the external reality to the individual in a complex way.
SOMAYEH rafigi; Muhammad Asghari; Mahmoud Sufiani
Abstract
In the phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty tries to transcend the traditional explanation of intentionality and therefore he describes the phenomenology of the body. According to Merleau-ponty, there is no separation between the world and consciousness and these two are completely tied together. ...
Read More
In the phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty tries to transcend the traditional explanation of intentionality and therefore he describes the phenomenology of the body. According to Merleau-ponty, there is no separation between the world and consciousness and these two are completely tied together. Conciseness for Merleau-ponty is not a mere subject which constitute the eternal essences and natures and gives meaning to phenomena, but it is the body-subject that direct toward the world and cannot be separated from this field of action in the world. The objects of this subject-body are also in the phenomenal fielding that determined by directing the lived body toward them and it comes out of ambiguity and thus, their meaning is born. Accordingly, intentionality for Merleau -Ponty, is the orientation in the world and directedness toward the world itself, and the intentional states are realized in collisions or physical states in a physical and concrete environment. In this paper, we try to provide an interpretation of the concept of intentionality from the perspective of Merleau-ponty, which he calls it "practical intentionality", and we want to express its differences and similarities with Husserl’s intentionality. The main difference between the views of these two philosophers is in Merleau-ponty’s criticism on Husserl’s of Noesis-Noema structure. He claims that meaning is intrinsic to the phenomenal field and it is not possible to analyze it by a distinction between matter and form.
